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Abstract ― This paper estimates the effects of outward Foreign Direct Investment 
(employment in the affiliates abroad) on employment, wages, and the wage share in 
Austria using panel data for the period of 1996-2005. There is evidence of significant 
negative effects of FDI on both employment and wages, and consequently on the wage 
share. The results are not limited to workers in low skilled sectors or blue collar 
workers. The negative employment effect is primarily due to the rise in the employment 
in the foreign affiliates in Eastern Euope. The negative wage effects are originating 
from affiliate employment in both the East and the developed countries in industry, but 
no effect is found in the total economy.  
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I. Introduction 
 
The aim of this paper is to empirically analyze the impact of Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) outflows on the labor market outcomes in Austria. In the last fifteen years 
there has been a significant increase in the globalization of the Austrian economy through an 
increase in exports, final imports, offshoring (intermediate imports), and outward FDI. The 
integration of the Central and Eastern Europe (CEECs) to the European economic sphere, 
added a new dimension to the globalization of the Austrian economy, although Austrian FDI 
towards Western Europe also increased significantly during this period. Austria is one of the 
relatively most integrated Western high wage-country to the low-wage East. Its geographical 
proximity as well as historical ties and its small size played a role in this fast integration.  
The globalization of the economy has coincided with adverse developments in the 
labor markets, raising doubts about a causal link. Since the 1980s industrial employment is 
decreasing, and total employment is stagnant in spite of the jobs created in services. In the 
meantime real wages have stagnated in the total economy particularly since the mid 1990s. 
The service wages are even slightly declining in the last five years on average. This 
development is in striking contrast to the strong improvement in labor productivity, which has 
always exceeded real wage increases since the 1980s with few exceptions.     
As a combination of these developments (in employment, wages, and productivity), 
the wage share (labor compensation/gross value added in non-agricultural sector) declined 
from a level of 72% in 1978 to 54.9% as of 20051. The deterioration continued in the past 
years in spite of the profitability gains due to enlargement (Altzinger, 2006). The decline in 
labor share is not specific to Austria, albeit it has experienced one of the steepest declines in 
the EU. The general declining trend in labor’s share in many OECD countries since the mid-
1970s and early 1980s is addressed recently by the OECD (2007) and the IMF (2007) in 
addition to some earlier studies (Harrison, 2002; Diwan, 2001; Epstein, 2000, Stockhammer 
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et al, 2007). Breuss (2007) finds that increased trade with the East and FDI in general causes a 
decline in the labor share in the developed EU countries.  
Austria is an interesting case to investigate the effects of FDI on labor market 
outcomes, being a small economy, which is highly integrated to the other high wage as well 
as low wage countries. In this paper first we estimate the effects on employment and wages, 
and then combining the effects on both wages and employment we calculate the cumulative 
effects on functional income distribution, i.e. wage share. The estimations are made for a 
panel of sectors for the period of 1996-2005. The effects are separately estimated for low and 
high skilled sectors, industry vs. services, and blue vs. white collar workers. We pay particular 
attention to the possible different effects of FDI in the developed countries vs. the CEECs and 
the other low wage countries. The contribution of this study is to combine the effects on 
wages and employment to address the effect of FDI on functional income distribution using 
detailed sectoral analysis.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section two reviews the theoretical 
expectations and empirical findings about the FDI effects on labor market outcomes. Section 
three presents the model. Section four discusses the data and methodological issues. Section 
five presents the stylized facts of FDI and labor market outcomes in Austria. Section six 
present the estimation results. Section seven concludes. 
 
II. The literature on the home country effects of FDI 
 
FDI will generate two different channels of effects on the labor market outcomes 
through changing the magnitudes of trade and changing the allocation of types of production 
within the firm. Regarding both effects, it is important whether FDI has a vertical (cost 
seeking) vs. horizontal (market seeking) character. The labor market effects are expected to be 
the strongest for cost-saving vertical FDI.  
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With respect to the effects through the mechanism of trade, while vertical FDI will 
lead to more intermediate imports, which may substitute certain types of domestic labor, it 
may however also create more exports (to the foreign affiliate through intermediate exports 
and elsewhere if there is a cost advantage obtained through FDI) and more output through 
scale effects as mentioned above, which can offset or can be offset by the labor replacement 
effects.  
Horizontal FDI on the other hand replaces the exports of the country, and may 
generate negative employment effects in tradable sectors, but in services these effects are less 
likely to take place. In the extreme case, if the affiliates replicate all activities, then 
employment at home can decrease (Head and Ries, 2002). But if affiliates produce only the 
final goods of the company and use intermediate inputs from the parent firm, this will 
generate a skill upgrading effect. 
Vertical FDI is particularly expected to change the factor composition of production at 
home. As certain jobs are relocated abroad, others may be created at home. Thus foreign labor 
might substitute some factors of productions, but complement others. In a capital abundant 
country, it could be expected that there will be some increase in the use of capital and less 
demand for labor. In a skilled labor abundant country the demand for skilled labor’s 
employment is also expected to increase relative to unskilled labor as headquarter services 
increase (Helpman and Krugman, 1985). So initially employment at the parent company may 
fall due to substitution effects, but then there may be additional production of skill-intensive 
products to be exported to the foreign affiliates (scope effects), and a general increase in 
market share and output due to cost saving effects (scale effects), which may increase also 
overall employment (Hanson et al., 2003). Thus the overall effect depends on the negative 
substitution vs. positive scope and scale effects. The argument then follows that if labor 
markets are flexible, there will be negligible effect on total employment.  The net effect on 
employment would then depend on the net of jobs destroyed and created. But skilled labor 
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might also be substituted by foreign labor through an overall increase of capital intensity at 
home.  Horizontal FDI will have less effect on the composition of factor demand, since it does 
not particularly change the international division of labor, but it can still create more demand 
for factors, e.g. skilled labor, that are used more intensively at the headquarters of the 
multinational firm.  
In the literature the effects of FDI on home country labor markets are tested by 
estimating the effects of affiliate sales or employment or labor costs on parent employment 
and wages. The estimations usually include a control variable for the scale of production at 
home. Therefore these regressions are more likely to capture the effects of vertical FDI rather 
than horizontal FDI (Molnar et al, 2007). To decrease this bias, we will use value added 
instead of output as a control variable; but nevertheless part of the scale effect will still be 
captured by the value added effect in the case of the horizontal FDI. Regarding the direction 
of the employment effect, again the question is whether foreign labor is a substitute or 
complementary to domestic labor, and in the former case to what extent scale vs. labor 
replacement effects dominate. The effects are expected to be also larger for small home 
country relative to the location of the affiliates (Molnar et al., 2007). 
Regarding the wage effect, for a given capital/labor ratio the effect would be positive 
if foreign labor is complementary, and negative if it is a competitor. But particularly 
efficiency seeking FDI may generate negative effects through the so called threat effects as 
pointed out by the political economists (Onaran, 2009; Harrison, 2002; Diwan, 2001; Burke 
and Epstein, 2001; Rodrik, 1997; Crotty et al, 1998).  The increase in international capital 
mobility and offshoring and the asymmetry between the fall back options of capital vs. labor 
may lead to labor disciplining effects and downward pressure on wage demands. The source 
of the effect is the threat of relocation, which leads to a defensive race to the bottom of the 
wages at home. This may particularly be the case if the destination of FDI is low wage 
countries, However even among high wage countries capital mobility may generate certain 
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labor disciplining effects. The effect may take place even in the absence of relocation. An 
increasing number of studies emphasize that labor disciplining and threat effects of capital 
mobility may not be directly reflected in the actual volumes of capital flows, and call for 
direct qualitative evidence on these effects (Burke and Epstein, 2001). In this paper such 
threat effects without an actual relocation of production taking place will show up in the time 
effects in our estimations.  
In the empirical literature regarding the home country effects of FDI, there are rather 
mixed results (Molnar, et al, 2007; Lipsey, 2002). Blomström et al. (1997) analyze the 
relation between employment in the parent firm and foreign production based on firm level 
data for the US and Sweden, and find some negative relationship in the US, but a robust 
positive relation in Sweden. Lipsey (2002) however finds positive relation in the machinery 
sector in the US, and negative effect in the transport equipment sector.  Braconier and Ekholm 
(2001) show that Swedish firms’ expansion in the CEE leads to job loss in mostly low wage 
EU countries than in high wage countries. Lipsey et al (2000) find for Japan a positive effect 
of foreign output on domestic employment. For the case of US, Brainard and Riker (1997) 
also find that there is substitution between labor at home and abroad, however the substitution 
is greater between affiliates in different countries.  Different from these previous studies 
Desai et al (2005) and Hanson et al (2003) find a positive effect of affiliate activity on 
employment in manufacturing in the US. Desai et al (2005) also find a positive association 
between wages between foreign affiliates and parent companies. Molnar et al (2007) find that 
outward investment has a significant positive effect on employment growth in the US, but a 
negative effect in Japan, and no effect in Germany; additionally they find that in 
manufacturing industries in the OECD with strong links to non-OECD countries, outward 
investment makes labor demand curve more elastic at home and increases the speed of 
adjustment; but in services outward FDI has a positive effect on employment. In the case of 
multinationals in the EU, Konings and Murphy (2003) finds substitution effect between parent 
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employment and its affiliates in the EU15, but no effect with respect to the low wage regions 
in the EU and the CEECs. Regarding the effect of the affiliate labor costs in the CEECs on 
employment European Commission (2005) finds negative effects in France and Belgium, and 
Becker et al (2005) find negative effects in Germany and Sweden, albeit higher substitution 
effects are found with respect to EU15 in the latter study.   Lipsey (2002) also points out that 
there may be a difference between firm and industry level studies: Substitution among types 
of activities may take place not only between home and foreign operations of a firm, but also 
between parent firms and non-multinational firms in the same industry at home.  
Regarding the effects of FDI on labor market outcomes in Austria, Bellak and 
Altzinger (2001) find a negative effect of affiliate sales on parent employment. Based on firm 
level survey results, Marin (2004) predicts that 22.000 jobs were lost in Austria due to 
outward FDI towards the East during 1990-2001, most of which were skilled jobs. However 
she finds no statistically significant effect of affiliate wages on parent company’s employment 
(Marin, 2004). Pfaffermayr (2001) finds that employment in the foreign affiliates of Austria in 
developed countries are substitutes for domestic labor, whereas foreign employment in the 
East is complementary, since domestic employment does not respond to wage differences 
with respect to the East. Falk and Wolfmayr (2007) find mixed evidence based on static vs. 
dynamic estimations: according to the static results, they find a significant negative effect of 
foreign affiliate employment in the five New Member States in the East on domestic 
industrial employment, and a positive effect on services employment. However the dynamic 
estimation results point at no significant impact on industrial employment, but a negative 
effect on services due to both affiliate employment in developed countries and the East. At 
firm level data, they find no effect.   
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III. The model 
 
The model exists of a pair of equations for labor demand and wage bargaining, which 
then is solved simultaneously and inserted into a wage share equation to calculate labor’s 
share in value added.  
The industry’s derived demand for labor is given as follows: 
ittiftikicttiktiqitwtiti fictkqwl ,,,,,, )ln()ln()ln()ln()ln()ln( σβββββββ +++++++=   (1) 
where ln(li), ln(wi), ln(qi), ln(ki), ln(icti), and ln(fi) are the employment, real wage 
(labor compensation, deflated by sectoral producers price index), real value added, real non-
ICT capital stock, real ICT capital stock, and employment in foreign affiliates in sector i 
respectively, and all are in logarithms. The focus of the paper is the effect of employment in 
foreign affiliates as a demand shifter, f, as we will discuss in more detail below. The other 
variables are the control variables. Capital stock is disaggregated as normal and ICT capital to 
differentiate the technology effects from extensive investment. The labor demand is based on 
a production function with a quasi-fixed capital constraint in the short run2. Theoretically a 
positive labor demand effect of output is expected.  The demand for labor is expected to be 
negatively affected by the real wages from a classical point of view; however this is an 
empirical issue for this study to be tested. Non-ICT capital may be substituting or 
complementing labor; the latter would be the case if the firm has excess capacity. But a 
negative substitution effect of ICT capital may be expected at least for less skilled workers. iβ  
is a sector specific coefficient. βt is the time dummy, capturing time specific shocks such as 
exogenous technology shocks not captured by the ICT capital stock, or policy changes and 
other institutional factors such as employment taxes, employment legislation that may affect 
labor demand.3  
The wage bargaining model is given as follows: 
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ittiftikicttiktiltiti fictklw ,,,,,, )ln()ln()ln()ln()ln( εαααααα ++++++=  (2) 
where all variables are as defined above. This model is consistent with union 
bargaining and efficiency wage models (Konings and Vandenbussche, 1995; Greenaway et al, 
1999b) In order to avoid the complications of modeling the formation of price expectations, 
an ex post bargained wage model is used. We thus look at the outcome of bargaining, i.e. the 
(ex post) real wage. Furthermore to be parallel to the labor demand equation, we are 
estimating real wages deflated by producers’ prices rather than consumer prices4. Again the 
focus is on employment in foreign affiliates, f, which capture the effects of relocation on the 
bargaining power of domestic labor, and shift the bargaining curve as we will discuss in more 
detail below. The other variables are control variables. The capital/labor ratio, thus 
ln(k)+ln(ict)-ln(l), determines the productivity of labor and worker’s aspirations and will have 
a positive effect on wages, but the degree at which they can index wages to productivity 
improvements will depend on their bargaining power. Also in more capital intensive sectors 
with a higher capital/output ratio the organizational strength and the bargaining power of the 
workers will be higher, and firms would be more willing to accommodate wage demands 
since labor costs are constituting a smaller part of their total costs. In the case of ICT-capital, 
however, the positive effect may be reversed with a technological replacement effect, 
particularly in the case of less skilled workers, who may be substituted with ICT-capital. This 
effect will disappear if capital and labor are complementary.  The employment in the sector 
captures the insider power and the demand effect, and will affect workers bargaining power 
positively and lead to higher real wage. However the responsiveness of wages to employment 
will also depend on the strategy of the labor unions, i.e. the trade off between wages and 
employment for the unions during a recession. Unions may choose to bargain for job 
protection and accept stagnant wages, in which case the positive effect of employment on 
wages will disappear. Moreover in our model employment and capital stock are used both in 
logarithms, as opposed to a model with employment and capital/labor ratio. Thus the negative 
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denominator effect of employment in the capital/labor ratio will also be incorporated to the 
coefficient of employment in our model, making the interpretation of the sign of the 
coefficient hard. We nevertheless prefer this model because it is parallel to the employment 
model, which will have a computational advantage when deriving the wage share below. αi is 
a sector specific coefficient. αt is the time dummy, accounting for the economy wide labor 
market conditions that affect workers’ outside options5, an alternative economy wide wage6, 
and the institutional factors that may affect the bargaining power like union density, collective 
bargaining coverage7, and structural change in the composition of the workers.   
Finally the wage share, the share of wage bill8/gross value added of the sector (ws) is 
by definition actual real wage (bargained wage deflated by producer’s price index, w) over 
productivity (real value added/employee)9: 
ttt lqwws )//(=          (3) 
Taking logarithms, ln(ws) is defined as 
ln(ws)=ln(w)+ln(l)-ln(q)        (4) 
Substituting ll equation (1) in lwr (equation 2) we get ln(w) expressed only in terms of 
the explanatory variables, x, which is the vector of ln(q), ln(k), ln(ict), and ln(f) as defined 
above:  
lw
ittixlxllti
ti
x
w αβ
εβααβααα
−
+++++=
1
)(
)ln( ,,,       (5) 
Similarly substituting lwr (equation 2)  in ln(l) (equation 1), we get ln(l) expressed 
only in terms x as above: 
lw
ittixwxwwti
ti
x
l αβ
σαβββαββ
−
+++++=
1
)(
)ln( ,,,       (6) 
Then substituting both equation 5 & 6 in lws (equation 4) we get:  
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(7) 
Taking the derivative of ln(ws) with respect to the components of x, e.g. foreign 
affiliate employment, ln(f), which is our interest in this paper, we calculate the effect on ws 
for a given value added (q)10: 
lw
lfwf
f
ws
αβ
αββα
−
+++=∂
∂
1
)1()1(
ln
)ln(        (8) 
This expression incorporates the effect of foreign affiliate employment on wages 
discounted by the effect of wages on employment (if wages have a negative effect on 
employment) and the effect of foreign affiliate employment on employment amplified by the 
effect of employment on wages (if employment has a negative effect on employment), both 
discounted by a common factor ( lwαβ−1 )11. If neither wages nor employment affect each 
other ( wβ = lα =0), then the effect of foreign affiliate employment on the wage share is simply 
the summation of its effects on wages and employment. 
 
IV. Data, estimation methodology and specification of the equations  
 
The empirical analysis is based on the panel data of the sub-sectors of industry and 
services. Appendix A reports the data sources. The panel data technique addresses the 
research questions based on variations both over time and across sectors. The other advantage 
of panel data is that it makes empirical tests possible with a database of relatively short time 
dimension.   
The effects of outward FDI on the labor market outcomes at home is measured by the 
effects of employment in the foreign affiliates of Austria (weighted by the share of the 
Austrian firm) in each sector disaggregated as affiliates in developed countries with relatively 
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higher wages and the East12. FDI to other countries is not included as a third category since 
their share in total outward FDI is negligible. The sectors are defined according to the sector 
of the foreign affiliate. FDI data at this detail is available only at the level of 1-digit NACE 
classification and for the period of 1993-2004. Capital stock is also only available at 1-digit 
level.   
In order to account for different impacts on skilled vs. less skilled labor, two methods 
will be used: first separate estimations are made for low and high skilled sector groups 
(Appendix B reports the list of the sectors and Appendix C reports the skill taxonomy); 
second the estimations are repeated for white-collar workers, who are assumed to represent 
skilled labor, vs. blue-collar workers, who are assumed to represent less skilled labor.  
Nevertheless, we need to be careful in assuming that all white collar workers are skilled 
workers, and all blue collar workers are low skilled workers. While white collar workers in 
both high skilled manufacturing and sevices industries can be skilled workers, they may well 
be low skilled workers in low skilled services sectors. Similarly blue collar workers in high 
skilled industries can be skilled workers. 
In all equations lags of the explanatory variables and the dependent variable will be 
used to account for short vs. longer run effects13. The lagged employment accounts for the 
adjustment process due to costs of hiring and firing. The lagged wage accounts for sticky 
wage adjustment through time. Furthermore, the capital stock and foreign affiliate data ends 
in 2004; in order to be able to estimate the effects including 2005, we will use the first and 
second lags of these variables. By doing so we do not lose observations overall. Since the 
effect of both capital accumulation and FDI on labor markets may require a long adjustment 
process using deeper lags makes also economically sense. 
Thus the equations (1) and (2) to be estimated for FDI effects on employment and 
wages take the following form respectively: 
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(2a) 
The sector index i=1,…,12 for industry14  i=13,…,20 for services, i=1,…,20 for total 
economy, and t=1996-2005. c is the affiliate country index corresponding to affiliates in 
developed countries vs. the East. We also estimate a pool for economy wide total high and 
low skilled sectors including both manufacturing and service sectors15. Both equations are 
also repeated for blue and white collar workers for the period of 1997-2005 since data for blue 
vs. white collar workers start in 1995 in NACE level classification. 
We estimate the dynamic equation in first difference form in order to transfer out the 
fixed effects, and use a generalized method of moments technique as in Arrelano and Bond 
(1991) to overcome the bias that will result in the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable 
due to differencing. Differencing also helps to overcome the possible problems associated 
with unit roots.16 We also compute standard errors that are robust to the existence of sector 
specific serial correlation. Additionally, the real wage is endogenous and therefore 
instrumented in the employment equation. In the wage equation employment, capital stock, 
and foreign employment are endogenous and instrumented. In the employment equation the 
instruments are employment dated t-2 and earlier, the second and third lags of real wage17, 
and the first differences of the exogenous variables, i.e. output, capital stock, foreign 
employment and their lags. In the wage equation the instruments are wages dated t-2 and 
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earlier, the second and third lags of employment, the third and fourth lags of the capital stock, 
foreign employment.   
Based on these estimation results we then calculate the long run coefficients using the 
contemporaneous and lagged effects and the speed of adjustment for the vector of explanatory 
variables, x, for employment equation as 
)1(
1
0
l
jxt
j
x β
β
β −=
−
=
∑
 (9) 
and for the wage equation as 
)1(
1
0
w
jxt
j
x α
α
α −=
−
=
∑  (10) 
The wage share effects in equation 8 are then calculated based on these long run 
coefficients. 
 
V. Stylized facts   
 
From early 1990s onwards Austrian FDI to both the developed countries and the East 
are increasing, with the increase towards the latter being higher. Austria’s total FDI stock in 
the East as of 2004 is 38.0% of its total FDI stock. Austrian FDI is predominantly in services, 
but the ten biggest Austrian investors in the NMS represent a mix of financial and industrial 
capital. Regarding FDI outflow the banking sector makes up 30% of the total (Havlik et al., 
2005).  
Table 1 shows the cumulative % change in foreign affiliate employment during 1995-
2004. The share of the employment in the foreign affiliates of Austria in the East in the total 
employment in foreign affiliates is 71.9% as of 2004, and is much higher than that of the 
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affiliates in the developed countries (24.4%). Particularly in the high skilled services sectors 
the share of the East increases to 91.9%. Employment in the affiliates of Austria in the East 
increased 190.9% in industry and 302.8% in services during 1995-2004. The increase in the 
high skilled industry has been 252%, exceeding that in low skilled sectors significantly. 
However the increase in the employment in the foreign affiliates of Austria in the East in the 
high skilled services has been phenomenal with a rate of 824%. Employment in the affiliates 
of Austria in the developed countries also increased remarkably, albeit with lower rates: 
87.3% in industry and 161.5% in services during 1995-2004. In the services the increase has 
been more important in the low skilled sectors, mainly construction and trade.     
Please insert Table 1 approximately here 
The increase in Austrian FDI goes along with the increase in Austrian exports as well 
as intermediate imports from the East. Austria’s international trade with the East is dominated 
by intra-firm trade. Almost 70% of Austria’s imports from the East and 22% of exports are 
trade within a multinational enterprise (Marin, 2004). 
Table 2 portraits the performance of labor markets during this period of 
internationalization based on the average annual change (compound average) of wages, 
employment, the wage share as well as value added and productivity for the sub-periods 
during 1976-2005 (and for the cumulative of 1990-2005).  
Please insert Table 2 approximately here 
The growth in value added has been strong during the period of internationalization, 
albeit slower than in the 1970s, however since the 1980s industrial employment is decreasing, 
whereas total (non-agricultural) employment is stagnant (a mere increase of 0.7% per year 
during 1990-2005). Employment is increasing in high skilled services, but low skilled 
services employment is stagnating. Within industry, the decline in low skilled industrial 
employment is stronger than that in high skilled industrial employment. The decline in 
manufacturing jobs is an ongoing process of structural change that started in the 1980s, but 
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the decline did not decelerate after 1990 compared to 1980-1990 period. The opposite trend in 
domestic employment compared with the increasing foreign affiliate jobs is also striking.        
    In parallel to the unfavorable developments in employment, real wages (per 
employee, deflated by CPI) stagnate in the total economy (non-agricultural) since 1990s. In 
the last five years (2000-05) there has been even a slight decline (-0.2% per year). This trend 
is similar in industry although less dramatic. The low skilled industry sectors have 
experienced a more remarkable wage moderation than high skilled.  The service wages have 
been even declining in the last five years on average (-0.4% per year), and the decline starts 
even earlier in the high skilled services, which have declined 0.4% per year during the last 10 
years (1995-2005).  Although the integration of Austria to the global economy seems to have 
affected employment much more than real wages and although the changes across sectors in 
wages are much more similar than in employment, the degree of wage moderation points at 
significant changes in labor’s bargaining power in the 1980s and then further since the second 
half of the 1990s. In the aggregate economy as well as in manufacturing real wage increases 
have lagged behind productivity since 1980s with few exceptions.     
These developments have led to a significant erosion in the share of labor as a whole 
in value added in the aggregate economy as well as its sub-sectors since the late 1970s with a 
further acceleration since mid-1990s. The decline in the wage share in the last ten years has 
been highest in the high skilled industry, followed by low skilled industry and low skilled 
services, and even high skilled services took their share of the loss with a decline in the wage 
share.   
Regarding the relative wage and employment of skilled labor18, in industry both blue 
and white collar employment declined, with the decline in the former being more remarkable. 
In high skilled services both types of jobs increased, whereas in low skilled services blue 
collar employment declined and white collar employment increased slightly. During the 
period of 1995-2005 the relative employment of white to blue collar workers increased in 
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industry and low skilled services, while their relative wage decreased, whereas both relative 
employment and wages of the white collar workers increased in high skilled services. Indeed 
the relative movements in the high skilled services point at a rather flexible response.  
 
VI. Estimation results 
VI.1 Employment 
 
Table 3a reports the estimation results for employment modeled as in equation 1a. The 
respective columns of the Table are for total industry, total economy, low and high skilled 
sectors (including industry and services), and services. The respective long run coefficients 
for the estimation results are in Table 4a. We will base our discussion of the regression results 
on the long-run effects, rather than separately discussing the current or lagged effects.  
Please insert Table 3 and 4 approximately here 
In spite of the advantages of the dynamic estimation method as discussed above, there 
is a disadvantage due to the small number of cross-sections in our case. The Sargan test (from 
the homoskedastic estimator, which is reported at the end of the result tables) can not reject 
the null hypothesis that the overidentifying restrictions are valid, however the test is 
weakened by the use of many instruments. However given the low number of cross-sections 
we could not avoid this problem. We at least tried to choose the specifications, where there is 
no second order autocorrelation in the first differenced residuals, which is an important 
condition for the validity of the estimations. Since the lagged dependent variable was 
significant in all specifications, estimating a static model would also have its weaknesses. 
Furthermore the existence of stochastic trend in the variables requires differencing to avoid 
spurious results, but then we lose information. 
We first start with the estimation results about the effects of foreign affiliate 
employment, and later discuss the effects of the control variables, i.e. output, wages, and 
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technology. In total manufacturing an increase in foreign affiliate employment in the East has 
a significant negative long run effect on employment in the same sector in Austria. The same 
effect takes place in the total economy and in both the low and high skilled sectors.   
The effects are economically significant as well. Table 5a shows the cumulative effect 
of each explanatory variable on employment, calculated as the long run coefficients 
multiplied by the actual change in the explanatory variable. A memo item in the last line 
reports the actual change in employment. These results indicate that in industry the 190% 
increase in affiliate employment in the East (82406 new jobs) over the period of 1995-2004 
has resulted in a decline of 7.7% in employment, which means a loss of 48145 jobs in 
industry in Austria during 1996-2005. Similarly the cumulative number of jobs that were lost 
in the total economy are estimated to be 123179 over 10 years (a decline of 4.7% in 2005 
compared to 1995) corresponding to an increase of 241% (188207 new jobs) in employment 
in the affiliates in the East in all sectors. To put it differently each job that has been created 
additionally over this period in the Eastern affiliates of Austria has substituted 0.58 jobs in net 
terms in industry, and 0.46 jobs in the total economy (as a ratio to jobs created in the Eastern 
affiliates in all sectors). These are the net effects showing the net of the jobs lost due to 
substitution and jobs created due to complementary and scale effects. These numbers are 
overestimating the actual change in employment, which has declined 4.9% in industry, and 
increased 7.3% in total economy. But they indicate that for a given positive effect of growth 
and a negative effect of technical change, employment would have declined 7.7% less 
industry if there were no Austrian foreign investment in the East in this period.  
Please insert Table 5 approximately here 
Regarding the employment in the foreign affiliates of Austria in developed countries 
while no effect can be detected in industry (at the aggregate level), there seems to be a 
significant negative effect in services (both white and blue collar). In the total economy 
affiliate employment in the developed countries seem to be substituting blue collar workers at 
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home, but there is no effect at the aggregate level19. The results indicate that for each job that 
was generated in the services industry in the developed countries 4.5 jobs were lost at home (a 
loss of 123148 service jobs in Austria per 27546 new jobs created in the developed countries). 
However these results need to be interpreted with care for estimations covering only few 
sectors (thereby few observations), and while the direction of the effects is indicative, the 
magnitudes can be misleading. 
Regarding skill differentials, estimation results for blue and white collar workers for 
the total economy and manufacturing are in the Appendix D Table 1. At the level of the total 
economy, the employment of blue collar workers seems to be more affected by the rise of 
employment in the Austrian foreign affiliates relative to the white collar workers, although 
both types of workers experience a decline in employment. But interestingly the workers 
working in the higher skilled sectors are more affected than those working in the lower skilled 
sectors; once again however employment declines in both sector groups due to capital 
outflow.  
We checked the robustness of these results by using an alternative dynamic estimation 
technique (Arellano–Bover/Blundell–Bond system estimator)20, and these effects are robust in 
the specification using the lags for the industry, but not for total economy. The estimation 
results are in the Appendix D Table 2. However when current values are used instead of 
lagged values, the results are not significant. Nevertheless, since it takes a while for domestic 
production and employment to adjust to the changes in the international division of labor and 
the possibility of new production locations abroad, lagged effects are important, and should 
not be disregarded. Also the shift from substitution to scope and scale effect can also be only 
observed through a longer time horizon. The results of the alternative specification indicate 
even a larger effect of the employment in Eastern affiliates: a cumulative decline of 10.4%, 
which correspond to a loss of 64760 jobs, i.e. 0.79 jobs per job created in the East.  
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Regarding the control variables, while growth of value added as well as non-ICT 
capital has a positive effect on employment, the growth of ICT capital has a negative effect on 
employment growth in industry reflecting the effects of labor saving technical change. The 
effect is highly significant in spite of the existence of time dummies.  In the total economy the 
effect ICT capital as well as non-ICT capital is insignificant, whereas growth remains to be 
significant. The technical change in this case is only captured by the time dummies. The 
negative technological change effect of ICT capital is evident for the employment of blue 
collar workers economy-wide, but not for white collar workers. Non-ICT capital also has a 
negative effect on total blue-collar employment. In industry while blue-collar employment is 
responsive to changes in production, white collar wages are not; the demand for white collar 
workers are also less responsive to wage changes. At the total economy level only the demand 
for blue collar workers is sensitive to wages.   
Time dummies remain significant despite the presence of capital stock as an 
explanatory variable. This not only captures the ongoing structural change but also other 
exogenous technical change effects that are not captured by the capital stock.  
If we compare our results with the previous research results, the negative effects of 
Eastern affiliate employment is consistent with the findings in Bellak and Altzinger (2001), 
and the survey evidence in Marin (2004), but she finds no negative effect of  affiliate wages. 
Regarding Falk & Wolfmayr (2007), while the negative effect of affiliate employment in 
services is consistent with their dynamic estimation results, we find no effect of Eastern 
affiliate employment in services, whereas they do. Furthermore for industry they find no 
significant effects both at sectoral and firm level. One difference is that they cover only the 
Eastern employment in the five NMS. The more important difference is the use of lags. While 
they do not use lagged effects, we find that this makes a difference in the results. They use the 
Arellano–Bover/Blundell–Bond system estimator, but our results using the same estimator 
with lagged effects also indicate a negative effect of affiliate employment in the East. 
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However, Falk & Wolfmayr (2007) also mention that aggregate studies might be hiding 
important firm level adjustment processes, which we also agree. Based on firm level data they 
find no significant effect. 
 
VI.2 Real wages 
 
Table 6a reports the estimation results for real wages modeled as in equation 2a. The 
respective columns of the table are for total industry, total economy, low and high skilled 
sectors (including industry and services), and services. The Sargan test unfortunately is again 
hinting at a problem with the use of too many instrumental variables, however there is also 
not a better way of dealing with the problem given data limitations as discussed above. The 
respective long run coefficients for the estimation results are in Table 4b.  We first start with 
the estimation results about the effects of foreign affiliate employment, and later discuss the 
effects of the control variables, i.e. employment and technology. 
Please insert Table 6 approximately here 
According to the long-run coefficients, employment in the foreign affiliates in the East 
as well as developed countries have a significant negative effect n wages in industry, but no 
effect in total economy. In the industry the negative effect of Eastern affiliate employment is 
valid for both blue and white collar workers but the negative effect of affiliate employment in 
the developed countries is only valid for the white collar workers in the industry. In the total 
economy only the wages of workers working in low skilled sectors (including both low 
skilled industry and service sectors) are negatively affected from the increase in both type of 
affiliate employment, whereas there seems to be no effect on the wages of workers working in 
high skilled sectors. There is evidence of some positive effect of affiliate employment in the 
East on wages in services sectors (for both blue and white collar workers).    
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Table 5b shows the cumulative effect of each explanatory variable on wages, 
calculated as the long run coefficients multiplied by the actual change in the explanatory 
variable. In terms of economic significance, the increase in the affiliate employment in the 
East and developed countries resulted in a 17.9% and 7.2% cumulative decline in real wages 
in the industry during the period of 1996-2005 respectively. Thus altogether real wages would 
have increased 25.1% more in industry if there were no Austrian foreign investment in this 
period. When the low skilled sectors of industry and services are analyzed together there is 
still a negative cumulative effect of 5.8% and 4.8% of affiliate employment in the East and 
the developed countries respectively. 
At the level of total economy there seems to be no differential wage response for blue 
and white collar workers (See estimation results for blue and white collar workers for the total 
economy and manufacturing in the Appendix D Table 3). But the workers working in low 
skilled sectors have experienced downward wage pressures due to capital mobility, whereas 
there seems be no wage effect in high skilled sectors (Table 5b).  
Regarding the control variables, in industry while employment has a negative effect on 
wages, non-ICT capital stock has a positive effect, reflecting an increase in wages together 
with the capital intensity of the sector. The same is true also for the total economy as well as 
the low and high skilled sectors of the total economy. 
Again the time dummies remain significant and are mostly negative, indicating the 
significance of institutional factors as well as possible negative effects of capital mobility that 
is not necessarily reflected in the volume of actual transactions.  
 
VI.3 Wage share 
 
Combining the long run effects on employment and wages as defined in equation (8), 
we get the joint effect of the changes in capital stock (ICT and non-ICT) and the employment 
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in foreign affiliates of Austria. Table 4c reports the calculated long run coefficients for the 
wage share for total industry, total economy, low and high skilled sectors (including industry 
and services), and services. Table 5c report the cumulative %-points effect21 of the actual 
change in the explanatory variable.  These effects are partial effects for a given level of value 
added.  
Based on the estimation results, in industry the increase in employment in the foreign 
affiliates of Austria in the East and the developed countries has resulted in a cumulative 
decline of 13.3%-points and 4.7%-points in the wage share respectively during 1996-2005 
(thus a total of -18.1). These results overestimate the 8.2%-points actual   decline in the wage 
share, however the direction is suggestive. In industry, during 1996-2005 capital mobility 
affects both the employment and wages, thus also the wage share of the high skilled workers 
more. A possible explanation for that might be that the low skilled sectors were already on the 
decline before foreign direct investment Austria increased substantially. Again in the services 
a 3.1%-points negative effect of the rise in affiliate employment in the developed countries is 
found. Overall in the total economy the increase in the Eastern affiliate employment has 
resulted in a 1%-point decline in the wage share. The results are estimated to be much larger 
for the sub-groups of low and high skilled sectors (industry and services together), but the 
magnitudes between sectors do not differ.  However these large numbers are unreliable since 
estimated coefficients tend to be larger due to the low number of observations, when the 
sample is split. 
Technological change (the increase in ICT capital) also results in a decline of 9.2%-
points in the industry wage share. A minor positive effect comes from the growth in non-ICT 
capital stock. In the total economy there is evidence of ICT effect only at the sub-sector level. 
ICT capital leads to a cumulative erosion of the wage share by 4.4%-points in the high skilled 
sectors of the total economy. 
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VII. Conclusion   
 
This paper estimates the employment and wage effects of outward FDI on 
employment, wages, and the wage share in Austria. There is evidence of significant negative 
effects of FDI on both employment and wages.   
The negative employment effect of Austria’s investment abroad is primarily due to the 
rise in the employment in the foreign affiliates in the East.   The employment in foreign 
affiliates in developed countries seems to have a negative effect in services only, which could 
be interpreted as the horizontal FDI effect.  The negative wage effects are originating from 
affiliate employment in both the East and the developed countries in industry, but no effect is 
found in the total economy. There is evidence of some positive wage effect of affiliate 
employment in the East in the services.  Bringing together these effects we find that the 
increase in employment in the foreign affiliates of Austria has resulted in a deterioration of 
wage share with the effect originating from both country groups in industry, and only from 
the East in the total economy. 
The results are not limited to workers in low skilled sectors. There are also negative 
effects on white collar workers, although less than blue collar workers.  This provides some 
evidence of relocation of skilled white collared jobs in both the industry and the services. At a 
sectoral level in the total economy interestingly employment in the higher skilled sectors are 
affected more than those working in the lower skilled industries, whereas only the wages in 
low skilled sectors are negatively affected. This can be thought as an evidence of negative 
substitution effect on lower skilled workers in the high skilled sectors associated with skill 
upgrading and thereby positive scope effects on wages. 
Technological change also results in a decline in the industry wage share.  Time 
dummies remain significant and are mostly negative. In the employment estimation this not 
only captures the ongoing structural change but also other exogenous technical change effects 
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that are not captured by the capital stock. In the wage equation this shows the importance of 
institutional factors that are changing at the expense of labor’s bargaining power and the 
possibility of threat effects of potential capital mobility, which has not been realized yet. 
It could be said that these results are nevertheless reflecting a relatively short period of 
10-15 years, and thus only incorporating the substitution effects, and the stages where scope 
and scale effects are expected has not arrived yet. However labor market outcomes have 
persistence. Negative employment effects generate long term unemployment problems as well 
as a decline in labor’s bargaining power. Additionally job losses lead to a negative popular 
perception of European Integration, leading to political tensions. But this discontent as well as 
the negative effects of openness are not an unavoidable destiny. On the contrary the European 
Integration could be seen as an advantage to institutionalize the coordination of labor market 
policy and wage bargaining incorporating productivity-led wage increases to facilitate wage 
convergence along with a systematic EU policy on regional development and social cohesion, 
thus an economically relevant EU budget. This also defines new tasks for the trade unions in 
old member states in terms of communicating with the trade unions in the East, particularly if 
they are organized in different affiliates of the same multinational company.   
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Table 1. Cumulative % change in the Foreign Affiliate Employment, 1995-2004 
Industry Services Total Economy
Employment in the foreign affliates of Austria Low skilled High skilled Total Low skilled High skilled Total 
Developed 63.70 96.35 83.03 208.15 47.52 161.50 117.79
East 81.88 252.55 177.01 86.56 824.46 302.85 241.01  
 
 
 0
Table 2 Annual % change in labor market outcomes (compund average)
Wage 
share
Real value 
added Employment
Real 
Wage
Real 
Wage 
blue 
collar*
Real wage 
white 
collar*
Employment 
blue collar*
Employment 
white collar*
TOTAL ECONOMY
1976-1980 -0.03 2.80 1.45 2.09
1980-1985 -0.62 1.26 -0.31 0.33
1985-1990 -0.20 3.22 1.37 2.08
1990-1995 -0.21 2.29 0.78 1.11
1995-2000 -0.54 3.19 1.05 0.28 0.60 2.16 -0.23 1.03
2000-2005 -0.49 1.74 0.33 -0.19 0.13 -0.53 -0.39 0.63
1990-2005 -0.47 2.40 0.72 0.40 0.37 0.81 -0.31 0.83
 TOTAL INDUSTRY
1976-1980 0.51 2.93 0.49 2.49
1980-1985 -1.11 0.78 -2.57 0.73
1985-1990 -0.02 2.86 -0.50 2.68
1990-1995 -0.11 0.93 -2.03 1.74
1995-2000 -1.57 4.31 -0.93 1.08 1.32 1.06 -1.30 0.34
2000-2005 -0.09 1.62 -0.62 0.58 0.70 0.15 -1.69 -1.77
1990-2005 -0.66 2.28 -1.19 1.13 1.01 0.61 -1.49 -0.72
 TOTAL HIGH INDUSTRY
1976-1980 0.74 6.70 1.80 2.86
1980-1985 -0.74 1.23 -2.00 1.10
1985-1990 -0.35 4.92 0.87 2.80
1990-1995 -0.34 2.29 -1.70 1.94
1995-2000 -1.76 5.17 -0.02 1.15 1.14 0.77 -0.50 1.73
2000-2005 0.28 2.35 0.14 0.39 0.60 0.12 -1.31 -2.70
1990-2005 -0.68 3.26 -0.53 1.16 0.87 0.44 -0.91 -0.51
 TOTAL LOW INDUSTRY
1976-1980 0.31 0.21 -0.48 2.07
1980-1985 -1.43 0.39 -3.01 0.33
1985-1990 0.21 0.88 -1.69 2.33
1990-1995 0.13 -0.61 -2.35 1.45
1995-2000 -1.32 3.20 -1.83 0.78 1.41 1.16 -1.90 -1.42
2000-2005 -0.58 0.59 -1.45 0.64 0.77 0.44 -2.00 -0.52
1990-2005 -0.67 1.05 -1.88 0.96 1.09 0.80 -1.95 -0.97
TOTAL SERVICE
1976-1980 -0.19 2.75 1.98 1.89
1980-1985 -0.36 1.42 0.81 0.19
1985-1990 -0.20 3.34 2.17 1.89
1990-1995 -0.15 2.71 1.81 0.99
1995-2000 -0.23 2.85 1.66 0.11 0.30 2.45 0.31 1.14
2000-2005 -0.60 1.77 0.59 -0.39 -0.03 -0.53 0.21 0.96
1990-2005 -0.37 2.44 1.35 0.23 0.14 0.95 0.26 1.05
TOTAL HIGH SERVICE
1976-1980 -0.51 3.40 2.48 1.74
1980-1985 -0.73 2.36 2.19 -0.07
1985-1990 -0.44 3.26 2.37 1.65
1990-1995 -0.53 2.83 1.79 0.86
1995-2000 0.03 2.85 2.52 -0.34 0.52 3.47 1.51 1.48
2000-2005 -0.64 2.03 0.94 -0.43 0.41 -0.61 0.99 1.10
1990-2005 -0.42 2.57 1.75 0.03 0.47 1.41 1.25 1.29
TOTAL LOW SERVICES
1976-1980 0.09 1.88 1.52 1.91
1980-1985 0.05 0.04 -0.55 0.07
1985-1990 0.14 3.46 1.96 2.15
1990-1995 0.48 2.53 1.84 1.18
1995-2000 -0.68 2.84 0.68 0.50 0.32 -0.12 -0.46 0.33
2000-2005 -0.51 1.36 0.18 -0.43 -0.22 -0.35 -0.35 0.61
1990-2005 -0.27 2.24 0.90 0.42 0.05 -0.23 -0.41 0.47
*1995-2005
**1993-1994
 0 
Table 3. Estimation results: Δln Employment vs. Foreign affiliate employment (1996-2005)
Variable Industry Total Economy Total low skilled Total high  skilled Services
Δln Employment t-1 0.703 0.745 0.706 0.768 0.584
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Δln Real wage t -0.082 -0.090 -0.141 -0.015 -0.474
0.523 0.432 0.377 0.840 0.027
Δln Real wage t-1 -0.072 -0.040 0.280 -0.233 -0.057
0.683 0.789 0.124 0.066 0.745
Δln Real value added t 0.382 0.294 0.461 0.195 0.241
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.110
Δln Real value added t-1 -0.202 -0.178 -0.353 -0.077 0.065
0.007 0.021 0.003 0.095 0.375
Δln Non-ICT capital t-1 -0.260 -0.076 0.257 -0.496 -0.056
0.251 0.684 0.460 0.000 0.910
Δln Non-ICT capital t-2 0.331 0.234 0.028 0.568 0.278
0.093 0.126 0.926 0.000 0.478
Δln ICT capital t-1 0.132 0.047 0.132 0.084 0.040
0.014 0.256 0.133 0.041 0.388
Δln ICT capital t-2 -0.153 -0.041 -0.113 -0.093 -0.034
0.011 0.348 0.236 0.020 0.568
Δln foreign Employment developed t-1 0.000 0.001 0.014 -0.012 0.000
0.998 0.801 0.036 0.041 0.962
Δln foreign Employment developed t-2 -0.012 -0.007 -0.022 0.009 -0.016
0.318 0.222 0.022 0.178 0.001
 Δln foreign Employment eastern t-1 0.019 0.012 0.038 0.006 0.003
0.040 0.037 0.000 0.308 0.584
 Δln foreign Employment eastern t-2 -0.031 -0.017 -0.043 -0.013 0.005
0.000 0.019 0.000 0.072 0.184
Constant 0.003 -0.002 -0.008 0.004 -0.005
0.555 0.416 0.090 0.011 0.202
Number of observations 105 170 73 97 65
Number of groups 12 20 9 11 8
AR (2) p-value 0.947 0.486 0.101 0.232 0.112
Joint sign. of time dummies (p-value) 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000
Sargan test (p-value) 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000  
p-values under coefficients (in italics) 
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Table 4. Long run coefficients (1996-2005):      
a. Employment             
  Industry Total economy Services 
  Total Total Low High Total 
Real wage 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.991 -1.000 
Real value added 0.606 0.455 0.367 0.509 0.000 
Non-ICT capital 1.114 0.000 0.000 0.310 0.000 
ICT capital -0.071 0.000 0.000 -0.039 0.000 
Foreign affiliate employment-developed countries 0.000 0.000
-
0.027 -0.052 -0.038 
Foreign affiliate employment-east -0.040 -0.020
-
0.017 -0.056 0.000 
b. Wage             
  Industry
Total 
economy     Services 
 Total Total Low High Total 
Employment -0.685 -0.631
-
0.366 -0.726 -0.347 
Non-ICT capital 1.448 0.000 2.022 0.810 0.000 
ICT capital 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.036 
Foreign affiliate employment-developed countries -0.083 0.000
-
0.035 0.000 0.000 
Foreign affiliate employment-east -0.094 0.000
-
0.049 0.000 0.034 
c. Wage share            
  Industry
Total 
economy     Services 
  Total Total Low High Total 
Non-ICT capital 1.798 0.000 2.022 0.328 0.000 
ICT capital -0.022 0.000 0.000 -0.038 0.000 
Foreign affiliate employment-developed countries -0.083 0.000
-
0.052 -0.051 -0.038 
Foreign affiliate employment-east -0.107 -0.007
-
0.060 -0.055 0.000 
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Table 5. Cumulative % change effects (1996-2005)
a. Employment: Cumulative % change during 1996-2005 due to: 
Industry Total economy Services
Total Total Low High Total
Real wage 0.00 0.00 0.00 -2.89 -1.59
Real value added 18.90 11.21 7.06 14.38 0.00
Non-ICT Capital 0.71 0.00 0.00 8.81 0.00
ICT Capital -44.77 0.00 0.00 -8.22 0.00
Foreign affiliate employment-developed countries 0.00 0.00 -4.02 -4.34 -6.21
Foreign affiliate employment-east -7.72 -4.73 -1.68 -23.77 0.00
Foreign employment total cumulative %change effect -7.72 -4.73 -5.70 -28.11 -6.21
Memo item: Actual cumulative % change in employment -4.89 7.32 0.12 14.05 11.16
b. Wage: Cumulative % change during 1996-2005 due to: 
Industry Total economy Services
Total Total Low High Total
Employment 3.35 -4.61 -0.04 -10.20 -3.87
Non-ICT Capital 0.93 0.00 3.91 22.98 0.00
ICT Capital 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 8.10
Foreign affiliate employment-developed countries -7.23 0.00 -5.20 0.00 0.00
Foreign affiliate employment-east -17.93 0.00 -4.82 0.00 10.30
Foreign employment total cumulative %change effect -25.17 0.00 -10.02 0.00 10.30
Memo item: Actual cumulative % change in wages 12.86 3.91 2.83 2.91 1.59
c. Wage share: Cumulative %-point change during 1996-2005 due to:
Industry Total economy Services
Total Total Low High Total
Non-ICT Capital t-1 0.75 0.00 26.90 4.37 0.00
ICT Capital t -9.23 0.00 0.00 -5.42 0.00
Foreign affiliate employment-developed countries -4.74 0.00 -3.44 -3.32 -3.07
Foreign affiliate employment-east -13.34 -0.97 -8.00 -7.35 0.00
Foreign employment total cumulative %-point change effect of 
foreign affiliate employment -18.08 -0.97 -11.44 -10.67 -3.07
Memo item: Actual cumulative %-point change in wage share -8.24 -4.80 -6.73 -3.44 -3.76  
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Table 6. Estimation results: Δln Real wage vs. Foreign affiliate employment (1996-2005)
Variable Industry Total Economy Total low skilled Total high  skilled Services
Δln Real wage t-1 0.819 0.759 0.631 0.821 0.559
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Δln Employment -0.045 -0.014 -0.039 0.020 -0.153
0.414 0.813 0.556 0.652 0.037
Δln Employment t-1 -0.124 -0.152 -0.135 -0.130 0.011
0.045 0.012 0.067 0.055 0.923
Δln Non-ICT capital t-1 0.262 0.213 -0.704 0.344 0.371
0.030 0.117 0.143 0.005 0.202
Δln Non-ICT capital t-2 -0.019 -0.045 0.746 -0.199 -0.363
0.877 0.742 0.050 0.087 0.257
Δln ICT capital t-1 -0.037 0.039 -0.037 0.027 0.100
0.362 0.217 0.752 0.378 0.002
Δln ICT capital t-2 0.052 -0.016 0.098 -0.007 -0.084
0.255 0.644 0.404 0.843 0.003
Δln foreign Employment developed t-1 -0.015 0.001 -0.013 0.009 -0.001
0.001 0.873 0.015 0.131 0.902
Δln foreign Employment developed t-2 0.000 0.001 0.000 -0.006 -0.004
0.976 0.877 0.957 0.426 0.513
 Δln foreign Employment eastern t-1 0.002 0.000 0.014 -0.004 -0.002
0.771 0.921 0.109 0.272 0.646
 Δln foreign Employment eastern t-2 -0.017 0.001 -0.018 0.006 0.015
0.004 0.808 0.001 0.203 0.000
Constant 0.000 -0.004 -0.011 -0.004 -0.002
0.969 0.005 0.007 0.040 0.144
Number of observations 105 170 73 97 65
Number of groups 12 20 9 11 8
AR (2) p-value 0.197 0.125 0.376 0.227 0.740
Joint sign. of time dummies (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Sargan test (p-value) 1.000 1.000 0.414 1.000 1.000
p-values below the coefficients (in italics) 
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Appendix A 
 
Data sources  
 
Statistics Austria, Panel data of industries, 1976 onwards, NACE 2-digit  
 
FDI-database of Austrian National Bank, 1993 onwards, NACE 1-digit (At 2 digit level even 
total FDI data is hidden or does not exist in many sectors (15, 23, 25, 30, 33, 34, 35, 36)  for 
all years or most years). 
 
Association of Austrian Social Insurance, employment and median wage for white and blue 
collar workers,  only 1995 onwards at a comparable classification, NACE 1-digit for wages 
and NACE 2-digit for employment.   
 
EU KLEMS Database, March 2007, http://www.euklems.net for the capital stock, 1976-2004, 
NACE 1-digit 
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Appendix B Sectoral classification at 1-digit NACE level 
1-Digit  
10-14 Mining and quarrying 
MANUFACTURING 
15-16 Food products, beverages and tobacco 
17-19 Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear 
20 Wood and products of wood and cork 
21-22 Pulp, paper, paper products, printing and publishing 
23-25 Chemical, rubber, plastics and fuel products 
26 Other non-metallic mineral products 
27-28 Basic metals and fabricated metal products 
29 Machinery and equipment, n.e.c. 
30-33 Electrical and optical equipment 
34-35 Transport equipment 
36-37 Manufacturing nec 
  
40-41 Electricity, gas and water supply 
45 Construction 
50-52 
Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles, motorcycles and personal and household 
goods 
55 Hotels and restaurants 
60-64 Transport, storage and communications 
65-67 Financial intermediation 
70-74 Real estate, renting and business activities 
85-93 Health and social work, Other community, social and personal service activities 
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Appendix C: Skill taxonomy for manufacturing industries 
Skill groups 1-Digit 
Low Skill 
 
15-16 
17-19 
26 
27-28 
36-37 
High Skill 20 
21-22 
23-25 
29 
30-33 
34-35 
 
Service 
 
Skill groups 1-Digit 
Low Skill 
 
45 
50-52 
55 
High Skill 40-41 
60-64 
65-67 
70-74 
85-93 
 
Total economy and industry: Includes also mining and quarrying (classified as low skilled) 
 
Note: Classification is based on Peneder (1999). The medium skilled/blue collar industries are 
classified as medium skilled, whereas medium skilled/white collar industries sectors that are 
also technology driven are classified as high skilled; the other medium skilled/white industries 
are classified as medium skilled.  
 
 0 
 
Appendix D Table 1 Estimation results: Δln Employment vs. Foreign affiliate emp
Variable Industry Total economy
Blue White Blue White 
Δln Employment t-1 0.873 0.811 0.940 0.847
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Δln Real wage -0.445 -0.295 0.116 -0.126
0.088 0.039 0.521 0.110
Δln Real wage t-1 -0.175 0.102 -0.267 0.100
0.536 0.555 0.087 0.375
Δln Real value added 0.111 0.041 0.082 0.058
0.006 0.342 0.054 0.135
Δln Real value added t-1 -0.006 -0.005 0.033 0.004
0.914 0.868 0.527 0.903
Δln Non-ICT capital t-1 -0.572 -0.303 -0.899 -0.449
0.074 0.393 0.001 0.023
Δln Non-ICT capital t-2 0.660 0.474 0.849 0.544
0.015 0.065 0.000 0.000
Δln ICT capital t-1 0.132 0.030 0.132 0.061
0.027 0.678 0.101 0.228
Δln ICT capital t-2 -0.141 -0.075 -0.156 -0.068
0.018 0.247 0.063 0.228
Δln foreign Employment developed t-1 -0.016 -0.014 -0.012 0.002
0.154 0.024 0.030 0.549
Δln foreign Employment developed t-2 -0.008 0.008 -0.008 -0.001
0.492 0.431 0.059 0.874
 Δln foreign Employment eastern t-1 -0.011 -0.015 -0.005 -0.015
0.312 0.020 0.590 0.050
 Δln foreign Employment eastern t-2 -0.009 0.001 0.006 0.000
0.348 0.909 0.391 0.998
Constant 0.011 0.013 0.008 0.003
0.393 0.081 0.097 0.4364
Number of observations 96 95 154 153
Number of groups 12 12 20 20
AR (2) p-value 0.115 0.139 0.119 0.042
Joint sign. of time dummies (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Sargan test (p-value) 0.174 0.632 0.006 0.629
*1997-2005 for Blue and White Collar data
p-values below the coefficients (in italics)
 1 
Appendix D Table 2 Estimation results: ln Employment vs. Foreign affiliate employment, 
Methodology:  Arellano–Bover/Blundell–Bond system estimator (1996-2005)
Variable Industry Total Economy
ln Employment t-1 0.908 0.847  
0.000 0.000  
ln Real wage t -0.057 -0.138  
0.217 0.086  
ln Real value added t 0.142 0.217  
0.013 0.007  
ln Non-ICT capital t-1 -0.014 -0.043  
0.177 0.056  
ln ICT capital t-1 -0.007 -0.007  
0.162 0.320  
ln foreign Employment developed t-1 -0.003 -0.008  
0.522 0.198  
ln foreign Employment eastern t-1 -0.005 -0.003  
0.026 0.462  
Number of observations 132 215  
Number of groups 12 20  
Sargan test (p-value) 0.156 0.287  
Hansen test (p-value) 1 0.979  
AR (2) p-value 0.710 0.310  
 
p-values below the coefficients (in italics) 
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Appendix D Table 3 Estimation results: Δln Wages vs. foreign affiliate employme
Variable Industry Total economy
Blue White Blue White 
Δln Real wage t-1 0.447 0.412 0.845 0.530
0.000 0.004 0.000 0.000
Δln Employment -0.135 -0.287 0.158 -0.097
0.002 0.000 0.437 0.262
Δln Employment t-1 -0.007 0.094 -0.217 -0.117
0.866 0.049 0.265 0.228
Δln Non-ICT capital 0.020 0.094 0.004 0.433
0.898 0.602 0.987 0.047
Δln Non-ICT capital t-1 0.337 0.292 0.128 -0.072
0.037 0.102 0.530 0.694
Δln ICT capital t-1 0.016 -0.018 0.113 0.049
0.691 0.560 0.169 0.318
Δln ICT capital t-2 -0.008 -0.003 -0.106 -0.015
0.864 0.937 0.226 0.767
Δln foreign Employment developed t-1 -0.007 -0.011 0.000 -0.002
0.253 0.086 0.991 0.787
Δln foreign Employment developed t-2 0.001 -0.002 -0.005 -0.004
0.939 0.830 0.468 0.306
 Δln foreign Employment eastern t-1 -0.015 -0.016 -0.005 0.000
0.027 0.003 0.305 0.962
 Δln foreign Employment eastern t-2 -0.014 -0.007 0.010 0.003
0.016 0.223 0.246 0.525
Constant 0.003 0.011 -0.004 -0.006
0.552 0.028 0.065 0.198
Number of observations 96 95 154 153
Number of groups 12 12 20 20
AR (2) p-value 0.041 0.555 0.094 0.310
Joint sign. of time dummies (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.484 0.000
Sargan test (p-value) 1.000 1.000 0.610 0.925
*1997-2005 for Blue and White Collar data  p-values below the coefficients (in italics) 
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Endnotes 
                                                 
1 The wage share index adjusted for the employment strucure (basis year of 1970) and 
calculated as a ratio to net national income decreased even more sharply (Guger and 
Marterbauer, 2004).   
2 See Greenaway et al. (1999a) and Hine and Wright (1998) for a model with wage/capital 
cost as the explanatory variable in a model for trade effects. Since it is hard to measure the 
capital costs the authors then rely on time dummies to reflect this effect, assuming perfect 
capital markets. However if we assume that capital is quasi-fixed, then we obtain instead a 
capital constrained labor demand model.  OECD (2007) estimates a similar labor demand 
function to estimate the effects of imports.  
3 The analysis of these effects, albeit interesting, are outside the scope of this paper. 
4 Although the workers bargain for a targeted purchasing power based on expected CPI 
inflation, for the firms it is their producers’ prices (determined by the wage costs and non-
labor costs and their mark-up power) which also is a binding constraint for the wage demands 
of workers. So one could estimate the real wage equation either deflated by consumer or 
producers’ prices and account for these price differentials by adding the wedge, the ratio of 
CPI/PPI. But since it is not a core variable, we will drop it at the estimation stage to gain 
degrees of freedom.   
5 Economy wide unemployment to account for general labor market conditions is not added 
since this also requires dropping the time dummies; also in a panel context economy wide 
variables are less useful. 
6 In Austria wage determination is a result of industry-wide collective bargaining, but pattern 
bargaining makes it highly centralized. But Aiginger et al. (1996) also mention that 
subsequent negotiations at the firm level are possible, particularly in large firms, which are 
exposed to higher international competition. Nevertheless regarding the effects of alternative 
wage as well as pattern bargaining,  a reference wage like the average wage rate of the 
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economy could be included. While this would make sense, if one were only interested in wage 
differentials, it is defeating in our context, since the average wage needs to be explained and 
not taken as given. Furthermore it would require dropping the time dummies.   
7 There is no collective bargaining coverage or union density data compatible with NACE 
classification.  
8 We use labor compensation rather than wage and salaries to account for the non-wage 
payments to labor such as social security contributions of the employers as well. A correction 
of the wage share to account for the labor income of the self-employed was not possible due 
to lack of detailed sectoral data. 
9 This is a simplification in order to explain the changes in the wage share, assuming that the 
change in the producers’ price index and value added price index are the same, which in 
reality is different. 
10 Also a given and PPI/value added deflator is assumed. 
11 ( lwαβ−1 ) needs to be positive to have a meaningful solution. 
12 20 countries including the 10 Eastern European new member states, five non-member 
South Eastern European countries, and four European countries of the Community of 
Independent States (Russia, Ukraine, White Russia, Moldavia).   
13 Further lags are not used due to the limited sample size. They were also not significant. 
14 Industry includes 11 manufacturing sectors and mining and quarrying. Mining is added to 
the pool to increase the sample size; however the results are qualitatively robust to the 
exclusion of mining. 
15 The total economy excludes agriculture, since labor market dynamics in agriculture has a 
rather different character. 
16  Real wage, real value added, employment, capital stock, foreign employment, all suffer 
from unit root problems. Unit root tests are available upon request. 
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17 The instrument set in the case of the lags of employment is expanded as the panel 
progresses and the number of potential lags increases. This method is efficient; however it 
was not possible in the case of the other endogeneous variable due to the limited matrix size 
of the estiamtion software (STATA).  
18 The source of blue and white collar employment and wages is the Social Security records 
and wages are median wages, whereas aggregate employment and wages are based on 
national accounts and wages are mean wages. Therefore there are some differences in their 
changes. 
19 Although there are negative effects for both low and high skilled sectors at the level of the 
total economy, these results are less reliable due to the low number of observations, and 
wherever they are not consistent with the total finding, we will not emphasize them. 
20 Arellano–Bover/Blundell–Bond estimator is based on a system of equations: the difference 
equation as described above according to Arellano–Bond, adding the original equation in 
levels to the system, where variables in levels are instrumented with suitable lags of their own 
first differences. This method is particularly suitable for the employment equation which 
behaves like random walk. In the case of the real wage equation, this is less of a problem.  In 
this estimation we used orthogonal transformation instead of differencing to maximize the 
sample size in the presence of missing observations. 
21 Based on the long run elasticities for the wage share, we calculate the % change effect and 
finally express these effects in %-points, which makes more sense in the case of wage share. 
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